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ABSTRACT 
With the increasing usage of smartphones a plethora of security 
solutions are being designed and developed. Many of the security 
solutions fail to cope with advanced attacks and are not aways 
properly designed for smartphone platforms. Therefore, there is a 
need for a methodology to evaluate their effectiveness. Since the 
Android operating system has the highest market share today, we 
decided to focus on it in this study in which we review some of 
the state-of-the-art security solutions for Android-based 
smartphones. In addition, we present a set of evaluation criteria 
aiming at evaluating security mechanisms that are specifically 
designed for Android-based smartphones. We believe that the 
proposed framework will help security solution designers develop 
more effective solutions and assist security experts evaluate the 
effectiveness of security solutions for Android-based 
smartphones. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General – 
security and protection 
General Terms 
Security. 
Keywords 
Smartphone, Mobile device Security, Security evaluation, 
Android. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The smartphone market has grown dramatically in recent years 
[1]. While many players exist (for example, Google, Apple, 
Samsung, Microsoft, RIM, Ubuntu, and Mozilla), the major two 
OS players are Google (Android OS) and Apple (iOS). According 
to the 2013 Gartner report [1], in August 2013, the Android OS’s 
market share was 79% followed by iOS with 14.2%. A 
smartphone is basically a small sized mobile computer that 
includes several unique subsystems such as GPS; Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth, Cellular, and NFC connectivity; gyroscope and 
accelerometer sensors; etc. The smartphone's diverse set of 
capabilities opens the door to a fascinating new world of 
applications and new possibilities, a world that brings great 
comfort to the user by keeping them updated and providing 
accessibility to personal/business information and services, 
regardless of the user’s location. In addition, many of the 
operations that were traditionally done on the PC have shifted to 
smartphones. The growth in the use of smartphones presents new 
challenges for organizations. These mobile devices are expected 
to be part of an organization’s IT infrastructure. Because this 
exposes the internal network to new attack vectors, these devices 
should be properly integrated in a secured and safe way. This 
becomes more challenging in the case of bring your own device 
(BYOD), in which an organization needs to enforce its security 
policy on privately owned devices. The smartphone’s ability to 
access an organization's internal network means that it may 
retrieve and hold valuable business data. Therefore, smartphone 
became an attractive target for attacks. These range from social 
engineering [2] attacks to hardware [3] attacks in which cyber 
criminals exploit vulnerabilities in human nature, software and 
hardware in order to accomplish their goals. 
Since the release of Android-based smartphones in 2009, many 
security solutions for smartphones have been proposed by 
academia and industry. While the main focus has been on 
malware detection, host-based intrusion detection, access control, 
static analysis of applications, and encryption and isolation, 
recently, several solutions for system in which a secured/regulated 
phone that runs alongside a consumer phone on the same device 
have been proposed (both academic and commercial), ranging 
from application level solutions to hardware virtualization. 
In this study, we propose an evaluation framework consisting of a 
set of evaluation criteria for the evaluation of security solutions 
for smart mobile devices. We focus specifically on the Android 
platform. We review several security solutions and analyze the 
solutions according to defined set of evaluation criteria. The 
evaluation criteria are viewed from the eyes of a vendor that 
wishes to build a secure mobile product. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 
we review recent known attacks and threats on the Android OS. In 
Section 3 we review the set of available security mechanisms for 
Android. In Section 4 we present the proposed evaluation 
framework, and in Section 5 we apply the evaluation framework 
on a specific security mechanism: multiple phones running on the 
same device using virtualization in order to illustrate how to use 
our framework. We conclude the paper in Section 6 with a 
summary and conclusion. 
2. REVIEW ON ANDROID THREATS 
Many papers and technical reports related to Android threats have 
been published [4],[5],[6]. We can classify Android threats (or 
mobile OS threats in general) according to the methods that are 
used to acquire access to the device and the methods that are 
actually used to attack or inject the malicious code. 
2.1 Gaining access to the device 
In order to infect a smartphone with malicious code an attacker 
can use variety of methods to gain access to the device. These 
methods can be grouped into the following categories: social 
engineering attacks, physical access, and network attacks. 
Social Engineering Attacks 
Several social engineering attacks have been used to install 
malicious programs on smartphones. Application Repackaging is 
a common social engineering approach in which the attacker 
includes the malicious code in a legitimate application and 
publishes the modified application though one or more application 
markets [2], [7], [8]. It is usually difficult to differentiate between 
the legitimate application and the modified one. An attacker often 
uses applications that are purchased and distributed through 
legitimate application markets and offers free versions of the 
applications which include the malicious functions. During the 
first six months of 2011, most Android malware was spread 
through this method. An attacker will also package and distribute 
malware within a large number of applications to increase the 
number of infected users. Examples of such malware include the 
Walkinwat and DroidDream, a malware that was published with 
over 80 unique applications. 
Another malware family that employs social engineering attacks 
is the fake installer family. Such malware appears to be a 
legitimate application (usually downloaded from the fake market), 
but actually, when executed, it installs no real application on the 
device, but instead installs an application acting as Trojan horse 
for different malicious purposes [9]. This type of attack is used in 
the malicious applications: FakeregsMs.a, Faketimer.a, and 
FakeUpdates.a. 
Attackers use the fact that the protection provided by the 
application permission mechanism is not sufficient and install 
applications that maliciously uses permissions granted by an 
unaware user. This can be done by using confusing permissions 
definitions to hide the malicious application’s true purpose, using 
"exotic" language when asking permissions, or using a different 
font size for the permissions definitions as described in [2]. 
Another method of spreading malware uses the application update 
mechanism. In the first step of this method an attacker releases a 
legitimate application. When a large number of users have 
installed the application, the attacker releases an update 
containing the malicious functionalities [2], [8]. Device owners 
that have set their device to automatically update their installed 
applications will not be aware of the update at all. This approach 
minimizes the exposure time of the malicious application. The 
first malware to exploit this technique was the DroidKungFu. 
In the drive-by download method, the malicious application is 
downloaded automatically when the user browses a compromised 
Web page [2], [8] or when the user has their NFC turned on [10]. 
In some cases, the user must take action to open the downloaded 
application, while in other cases the installation of the application 
can start automatically. An example is the GGTracker Trojan 
which was spread though a malicious website. The GGTracker is 
automatically downloaded to a user’s phone after visiting a 
malicious fake Android Market website. The Trojan is able to 
sign-up a victim to a number of premium SMS, subscription 
services without the user’s consent.  This can lead to unapproved 
charges to a victim’s phone bill. 
In Phishing via SMS the user receives a crafted SMS with a link. 
By clicking that link the attack is executed [11]. Sometimes this 
attack combines a drive-by download injection as well. This type 
of attack is used in malicious applications such as Spitmo. 
Spitmo’s main function appears to be to intercept the single use 
transaction authentication number (TAN) that is communicated to 
the user’s mobile phone during a banking transaction. It 
accomplishes this by intercepting all SMS messages and 
forwarding their content to a remote website whose URL is 
defined in a configuration file. The user does not get to see any of 
these SMS messages. Spitmo keeps a low profile by running 
quietly in the background and providing the user with no evidence 
of what it is doing. It is designed to look like it is part of the 
system [12]. Malicious advertising (or Malvertising) is another 
social engineering method in which the malware it downloaded 
and installed though advertisements that are presented to the user 
inside legitimate applications. This is a highly dangerous channel 
as developers use advertisements inside their applications as a 
business model and to gain additional users [13].  
Physical Access to the Device 
In this type of attack the attacker has direct physical access to the 
device. In physical drive-by download the attacker can use the adb 
debugging tool (if enabled) in order to execute various actions 
such as: installing malicious applications, bypassing a locked 
screen, making system changes, and backing up data to a remote 
location, and also to perform an auto token cloning attack 
(described later) [14], [15]. 
In cases in which the adb service is disabled an attacker can use 
the recovery mode attack. The recovery mode includes a separate 
partition on an Android device that is usually used for 
maintenance. When entering the recovery mode the device's 
regular boot sequence is circumvented. Since there is no trusted 
component to the boot system, attackers can utilize the recovery 
partition by loading their own malicious images to gain privileged 
access to the user’s information without affecting user data. In a 
recovery mode attack, an attacker creates a customized recovery 
image with several modifications to files (e.g., init.rc and 
default.prop) in order to grant the necessary privileges. Then the 
attacker flushes the image to the recovery partition by running a 
manufacturer specific tool such as "odin" for Samsung devices 
[16]. After flashing the image, the attacker can access the 
recovery image by using a device-specific key combination and 
enter the recovery mode and automatically run its malicious code. 
fThe attacker can even gain super user rights and use the recovery 
mode to enter the shell and execute malicious code. 
A proof-of-concept showed that an attacker can use a modified 
charger to attack the device [3]. The charger is essentially a 
power brick with a BeagleBoard (a low-power open-source 
software and hardware single-board computer) inside it. Thus, a 
user will connect its device to a computer rather than a simple 
charger. Once the charger is connected to the USB port of the 
device it injects the malware [17]. 
When an attacker has physical access to the device they can use 
the cold boot attack. In this attack the phone is put into the freezer 
to cool down to minus ten degrees Celsius (in which the electronic 
components are cold enough and the rate of data fading is slow); 
when the device is frozen it is taken out, and a custom recovery 
image is flashed to the device via "download mode." Once the 
modified recovery is flashed, the new operating system can start 
and retrieve data from the memory which contains data from the 
previous execution, such as the PIN number used to enter the 
secure area of the device [18]. 
Network Attacks 
This type of malware injection exploits vulnerabilities in the 
mobile network architecture and protocols in order to eavesdrop 
and/or manipulate mobile data communications. One approach is 
to employ an attack via rouge network routers [19], [20]. 
Wireless networks are identified by their SSID number. When a 
device is registered to a wireless network (via Wi-Fi) it may ask 
the user to save the SSID number for automatic registration when 
the network will be identified again. Since the network name and 
its MAC address (the network interface’s unique identifier) are 
public, an attacker can create a network with the same name (as 
the original network) and a fake MAC address. If the user's device 
is configured to connect automatically, it will register to this 
network when it is detected, and the attacker will have access to 
all data that is transmitted to and from the device. 
Attacks using rouge base stations can occur when mutual 
authentication between the Subscriber Stations (SS) and the Base 
Stations (BS) does not occur (for example, in WIMAX, GPRS, 
EDGE, UMTS, or HSPA) [18]. In such cases, rouge base stations 
can generate and transmit any message to the SS.  
An attacker can also use the Near Field Communication (NFC) 
component (if switched on) to force the Android smartphone to 
browse a malicious website and download malware [21], or to 
relay an attack on contactless transactions [22]. 
2.2 Vulnerabilities and Exploitation 
The second stage, after acquiring access to the device, is the 
exploitation of vulnerabilities that eventually lead to the malicious 
code injection. In this section we review several known 
vulnerabilities, some of them has already been patched.  
Privilege Escalation 
There are a wide range of methods that can be used for acquiring 
root privileges on the device. A common approach is exploiting 
vulnerabilities in services/processes that run with root privileges. 
The adb setuid exhaustion attack (also known as 'rage against the 
cage') [23] is one of these methods. In this attack the attacker first 
identifies the processes than are allowed to run simultaneously on 
the system (denote NPROC) and the pid (process id) of the 
running adb daemon. Then, the attacker forks more than NPROC 
dummy processes. When reaching the NPROC, the attacker kills 
one of the dummy processes and then kills the adb daemon. The 
adb service restarts the adb daemon, and at the same time the 
attacker tries to reach the NPROC limit again; this leads to a race 
condition between the attacker and the adb daemon. When the adb 
daemon starts up on an Android device, it is running as root. The 
code will later check if it should stay as root, or run in secure 
mode which drops its privileges to the shell account. The attack 
attempts to max out the process so that when the adb daemon 
attempts to call "setuid()" in its code, the call will fail and the 
daemon will continue to run as root. The current adb code does 
not check if the "setuid()" call was successful or not, so it will 
keep running as root even if this fails [23]. 
In the KillingInTheNameOf attack the attacker exploits 
vulnerabilities in the customized shared memory allocator 
(ASHMEM) of Android in order to set adb daemon with root 
privileges. In the ASHMEM any user can remap shared memory 
belonging to INIT which contains the property space with 
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE permissions and toggle properties. 
Basically, this type of exploit invokes the "mprotect()" system call 
to add write access to its mapping of the system property space, 
and it is then free to modify any system property at will via direct 
memory write. It can be used to alter the "ro.secure" bit from "1" 
(shell privileges) to "0" (root privileges) as described in [24]. 
The udev exploit abuses the fact that in Android a large portion of 
the udev code has been moved in to "init" daemon. The udev code 
allows standard users to "hotplug" devices that may require root 
level access, such as a USB device. Udev versions before 1.4.1 
did not verify that these messages actually originate from the 
kernel. Thus, a rogue application can submit a message to udev 
and have an action executed (which, in the case of Android, is the 
init process running as root) [25]. 
Third Party Library Vulnerability 
This type of vulnerability is found in the third party library and 
native code so an attacker will try to exploit malformed boundary 
checks, type safety issues, and the cross platform compile 
mechanism. Browser exploits are designed to take advantage of 
vulnerabilities in a browser engine or software that can be 
launched via a web browser (e.g., Flash player, PDF reader, or 
image viewer). Simply by visiting a web page, an unsuspecting 
user can trigger a browser exploit that can install malware or 
perform other actions on a device [2], [7], [26]-[28]. 
For example, by default the privacy setting of a camera and 
microphone are set as enabled for scripting. A bug in the Flash 
player may allow an attacker to entice users to websites that take 
advantage of this bug that allows an attacker to inject a script 
behind images that can use the camera/microphone. A proof-of-
concept was shown for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and since 
Android supports Flash it is subjected to this kind of attack [29]. 
In SQL injection exploits, the attacker includes portions of SQL 
statements in an entry field in an attempt to get the website to 
execute a newly crafted SQL command that can extract data of 
interest to the attacker (e.g., a list of relations in the database) or 
modify data [30]. 
Cross-site scripting attacks may be used by attackers to bypass 
access controls such as the same origin policy. On mobile devices 
an XSS attack can inject a JavaScript XSS payload that can 
trigger the installation of any application on the phone when the 
user is browsing a legitimate website that was injected with XSS 
payload [28], [31], [32]. 
Dalvik Vulnerabilities 
Exploiting vulnerabilities in the Dalvik code can lead to a denial 
of service of the Android instance generator. This was previously 
done by exploiting a vulnerability in the Zygote that enabled the 
attacker to force the fork mechanism and flood the device with a 
large number of requests for dummy instances, thus using up all 
of the device’s memory resources [33], [34]. 
Another example is the ZimperLich exploit. Similar to the "adb 
setuid exhaustion attack," this attack exploits the fact that there is 
no check of the return value from the function "setuid()" of the 
Zygote process, triggered through Dalvik application components, 
and whose privileges are managed by Zygote. First, the exploit 
code forks itself repeatedly in order to reach the maximum 
number of processes allowed per uid (RLIMIT NPROC) for the 
app UID. It then issues a request to the Zygote over the local 
socket to spawn one of its components in a new process. When 
the Zygote forks a child process and attempts to set the app UID, 
and the setuid() call fails because the resource limit has been 
reached. As the Dalvik VM did not abort in this situation, 
execution proceeds, and the malicious application’s code is 
running in the same UID as the Zygote, i.e., as a root process. The 
Zimperlich exploit then proceeds to re-mount the system partition 
read-write and creates a setuid-root shell in the system partition 
for later use in obtaining root access at any time [24],[35]. 
Mulliner [36] introduces the Dynamic Dalvik Instrumentation tool 
that can be used for hooking upon the Dalvik (via JNI and Dalvik 
hooking library), thus enabling it to change/modify application 
code (i.e., injecting code) during runtime. 
The Plankton malware exploits a vulnerability in the Dalvik class 
loading capability and dynamically extend its own functionality 
[37]. Plankton is included in host applications as a background 
service. This background service is called in the modified 
onCreate() method of the main activity of the application. Thus, 
when the infected application is executed, it brings up the 
background service. The background service collects information 
such as the device ID and the list of granted permissions to the 
infected application and sends that information to a remote server. 
On the server side, the collected information is processed, and 
based on that information (especially the list of granted 
permissions), the server will return a URL for it to download. The 
URL points to a jar file with executable code (i.e., Dalvik 
bytecode). The jar file is essentially a payload, which once 
downloaded, will be dynamically loaded (through the standard 
DexClassLoader). Doing so will allow the payload to evade static 
analysis and make it hard to detect. After loading, the init() 
method of a hardcoded payload class is invoked (through the 
reflection API in Android). 
Finally, a method for hiding code sections of Android executable 
file is presented in [38]. This is done by patching the method’s 
declaration in the .dex file, re-computing the .dex file, and then re-
building the .apk. 
Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
Such methods use a rogue application that is placed on the 
communication line between the user and the service consumed. 
The rogue application pretends to be the wanted service from the 
user’s point of view. Thus, all information is tunneled through it, 
and making it accessible for the rogue application to 
manipulate/steal the data. 
For example, malware capable of performing an MiTM attack was 
discovered during 2012 by McAfee Labs [39]. This malicious 
application targets specific well-known financial entities posing as 
a Token Generator application. The malware uses the logo and 
colors of the bank in the icon of the application, making it appear 
more reliable to the user. To get the fake token the user must enter 
the first factor of authentication (used to obtain initial access to 
the banking account). If this action is not performed, the 
application shows an error. When the user clicks “Generar” 
(Generate), the malware shows the fake token (which is in fact a 
random number) and sends the password to a specific cell phone 
number along with the device identifiers (IMEI and IMSI). The 
same information is also sent to one of the control servers along 
with further data such as the phone number of the device. The list 
of control servers is located in an XML file inside the original 
APK. The first two lists are used to execute the MiTM attack by 
filtering incoming SMS messages to get those that have mTANs. 
If the originating address and message body are found in the 
“catch” list, the content is sent to the default control server. The 
SMS can also be forwarded to the number specified in the XML if 
it is configured in the “catch” list with the attribute “toSms” [39]. 
Other similar malware are Zeus and SpyEye [40], [41]. An 
attacker can also set up a Wireless Tether to make the phone 
appear to be a public Wi-Fi access point to the victim, and then 
once it is connected to the Wi-Fi network, the attacker can capture 
any traffic for later analysis [42]. 
Return to libc Attack 
Operating systems use several mechanisms to secure the system 
from exploiting stack overflow. One of these mechanisms is 
setting stacks to be non-executable and therefore, jumping to the 
shell code will cause the program to fail. This protection scheme 
is however, not foolproof. A variant of the buffer-overflow attack 
called the return-to-libc attack does not require an executable 
stack nor use shell code. Instead, it causes the vulnerable program 
to jump to some existing code, such as the "system()" function in 
the 'libc' library, which is already loaded into the memory [43]. 
JIT-Spraying Attack 
Android applications run as byte code (using interpreter) and not 
compiled code. In order to accelerate the process, an application 
code segment that is currently running is preoperatively compiled 
to physical machine code. Thus, the JIT compiler is one of the few 
types of programs that can be run in a non-executable-data 
environment. An example of that technique involved feeding 
ActionScript to the Adobe Flash Player VM which contained 
attacker-controlled constants by XORing them together as 
described in [44]. In the latest Android OS, the data execution 
prevention (DEP) [45] and address space layout randomization 
(ASLR) [46] protection mechanism was introduced to prevent 
return oriented programming (ROP) attacks. 
Network Architecture Vulnerability 
Network exploits take advantage of software flaws in the mobile 
operating system or other software that operates on local (e.g., 
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, DNS) [47], [48] or cellular (e.g., SMS, 
MMS) networks [49], [50]. Network exploits often do not require 
any user intervention making them especially dangerous when 
used to automatically propagate malware [2], [51]. 
Virtualization Vulnerabilities 
Hypervisors for virtualization are becoming available for Android 
which makes the Android device potentially vulnerable to such 
attacks. A proof-of-concept from the PC platform showed that 
hacking the hypervisor, or gaining control of one of the virtual 
systems and using the "escape to hypervisor" vulnerability is 
possible. This vulnerability allows an attacker to "escape" from a 
guest virtual machine and to interfere with other virtual machines, 
or the hypervisor itself. For example, a virtual server’s guest OS 
can perform lower-level system calls to the hypervisor, sometimes 
referred to as hypercalls. The hypervisor frequently doesn’t check 
the hypercalls to ensure that they were invoked by the guest 
operating system or an application running in the virtual server. 
As a result, if an attack comes through a guest operating system, it 
may get out of the virtual server and compromise other 
components, including the virtual host, hypervisor, other virtual 
servers or other hosts [52]. 
Android Debug Bridge 
When installing an application via a cable using the adb shell, no 
permission acknowledgement from the user is required, thus a 
malicious application can be granted all the permissions it 
requests [53]. As a case in point, on January 2014 a new malware, 
Trojan.Droidpak, that exploits the adb utility was discovered. This 
malware infects Windows machines and installs on the infected 
machine the adb command line tool. When an Android device is 
connected to the infected machine via USB it installs a malicious 
apk. This attack vector will work only if the “USB debugging” 
option on the device is enabled [54]. 
Kernel vulnerability 
This exploit uses vulnerabilities within the kernel to gain user 
information, or root privileges [55], [56]. The kernel is major part 
of the Android's OS. Adding modules to the kernel increases the 
risk for vulnerabilities. Two known vulnerabilities within the 
kernel that can allow an attacker to gain user information or root 
privileges are discussed in [55] from the Tab's family devices' 
perspective. The first is that malicious programs can escalate the 
root-level privilege of a process, through which it can disable the 
security software, inject malicious codes and install rootkits. It 
does so by using the lack of a boundary check to set a kernel 
buffer overflow when calling "vhost ioctl ctrl module regrdwr" 
read and write sub functions (these functions are managing the 
kernel memory access). The second pitfall exploits the fact that 
there is no size check in function "BUG ON(IOC 
SIZE(cmd)NVHOST IOCTL CTRL MAX ARG SIZE)". The 
code does not check the size of "(IOC SIZE(cmd)" which leads to 
system crash. Combining the two pitfalls together can generate a 
DoS attack. Another vulnerability was found in the Samsung 
Galaxy S3's kernel. The kernel allows the device to be readable 
and writable by all users and gives access to all physical memory 
thus resulting in a privilege escalation attacks [56]. 
3. SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR ANDROID 
In order to harden and protect an Android device several 
safeguards may be employed. Many mechanisms and solutions 
are already provided by security companies, and many of them 
were proposed and evaluated by the academic community. In the 
following paragraphs we provide a description of several security 
mechanisms that can be installed on Android-based devices in 
order to improve their security. 
3.1 Anti-Malware 
To identify and remove malware, anti-malware software examines 
files, email attachments, memory, system configuration, MMS, 
Bluetooth objects, etc. It usually identifies known malware based 
on a signature repository. Several commercial solutions are 
available for Android which provide an anti-malware component. 
There are also open-source anti-virus and rootkit detectors that 
can be ported to Android such as the ClamAV [57]. Anti-malware 
is a well-known solution and is extensively used in other 
platforms. At this time, the anti-malware solution does not seem 
to be effective for mobile devices. The reason for that is the anti-
malware applications run at the same level and have the same type 
of privileges as any other application. Most of the currently 
available anti-malware applications are signature-based 
applications that require continuous updating of the signature 
repository; they provide very low false-positive rates but can 
detect known malware and. Rastogi et al. evaluated various anti-
malware protection applications and their resistance to 
transformation attacks [58]. 
3.2 Firewalls 
A firewall running on Android can prevent remote network 
attacks. It is a well-known and highly effective solution; however, 
it will not protect against attacks via web-browser, SMS/MMS, 
email, or Bluetooth and will not provide phone call filtering. 
Firewall is supported on Android through the NetFilter. The 
Netfilter is a Linux kernel subsystem that provides firewalling 
capabilities (e.g., packet filtering and connection tracking 
capabilities). In order to update the firewall policy, the control 
application should run with root privileges [5]. Recently, 
application-level solutions have been proposed such as the 
Mobiwol firewall [59] that provides a protection layer that allows 
applications to exert fine-grained control over the assignment of 
permissions through explicit policies that are similar to a network-
level stateful firewall. 
3.3 Intrusion Detection System 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) monitor the device, 
applications, or user's behavior to detect/prevent abnormal or 
known malicious behavior. Anomaly-based IDS can detect 
unusual phone call/SMS activity, denial of service attacks, and 
protect the information on the device in case of theft or loss. 
While it may detect new and isolated attacks, it will probably 
suffer from a high rate of false positives. Many academic 
initiatives to enhance protection of mobile devices have employed 
host-based intrusion detection systems comprised of an agent 
collecting various features from the device and the subsequent 
application of various algorithms to classify the behavior of the 
system as benign or malicious or to detect anomalies. Some 
solutions, such as Andromaly [60], [61] provides data collection 
and analysis on the device in order to detect abnormal, potentially 
malicious behavior on the device or an application. Other 
solutions, such as the Paranoid Android [62], are based on a 
centralized analysis that utilizes the multiple data sources and 
unlimited computation resources of the cloud [63]. As with any 
other security mechanism, the IDS should run with special 
privileges to ensure trusted monitoring. 
3.4 Access Control 
Android incorporates several access control mechanisms [4]. 
While these mechanisms are enforced on the application level or 
only on files, Linux can provide other tools that are directly 
enforced by the kernel. An example of such access control 
mechanism is the SELinux that was applied on Android [64], [65]. 
SELinux allows for the restriction of any process of the system, 
including root-owned, and by limiting access of processes and 
users to resources and/or services, the potential damage from 
malicious or exploited applications is limited. Its decisions are 
based on an access control policy, which should be deployed 
together with the base system. SELinux was shown to be effective 
against various attacks including protecting against vulnerability 
found in the Android volume daemon (vold) which runs as root 
(did not verify message origin), vulnerability in the Zygote 
process, Zimperlich, and even vulnerability in the Skype 
application [35]. Recent versions of Android provide simple 
authentication functionality based on a screen lock pattern 
mechanism. Such mechanisms can be extended so that the device 
can be locked remotely (when the device is lost or stolen), or by 
protecting sensitive information stored on the device, or on the SD 
card using password-based encryption. In the same context, Ni et 
al. [66] present the DiffUser framework that provides role-based 
access control mechanism for smartphone users. DiffUser was 
implemented and evaluated on Android. Each user can be 
assigned different rights. For example, only administrators can 
install/uninstall applications or the guest user can only use the 
phone application. 
Many research papers focus on the protection of the Android 
permission mechanism. During the installation of the application 
on Android, the user may view a list of required permissions and 
decline installation based on this list. However, there is no way 
for the user to allow only a subset of the required permissions. 
Nauman and Khan (2011) [67] added an advanced feature to the 
Package Installer enabling the user to decline certain requested 
permissions but still permit installation of the application. Such a 
change would be highly beneficial to security aware users. This 
solution would provide protection from the possibility of granting 
unneeded permissions that could be maliciously used. However, 
applications granted with a partial set of permissions may crash if 
the developer did not anticipate this in advance and provide a 
solution for such a situation (i.e., handle cases in which partial 
permissions were given). This solution can be enhanced for 
corporate users to provide the option for hardening Android 
devices by limiting granting permissions based on a predefined 
policy. Additional efforts for enhancing Android's application 
level permissions mechanism are presented by the Kirin system 
[68] and Secure Application INTeraction (SAINT) [69]. These 
two systems presented an installer and security framework that 
place an overlay layer on top of Android’s standard application 
permission mechanism. This layer allows applications to exert 
fine-grained control over the assignment of permissions through 
explicit policies. The XManDroid framework is used for 
monitoring and enforcing policy on the inter-component 
communication (ICC) channel [70]. The ConUCON system [71] 
enforces a policy that is based on contextual attributes. For 
example, a battery level lower than 30% will not permit games to 
be activated. The TISSA system implements a context-aware 
privacy mode that is able to control what information should be 
accessible to an application [72]. The TainDroid system was 
proposed for monitoring in real-time how third party applications 
access and manipulate users’ personal data [73]. 
3.5 Spam-Filter 
A spam filter can block unwanted MMS, SMS, emails, and calls 
from an unreliable origin. In the mobile phone arena spam filters 
are implemented using the white/black listing approach, with 
caller ID and a words/phrases dictionary used as the sources for 
allowing/blocking a call or a message. Products for spam filtering 
on Android are already available (e.g., SpamDrain and SMS Spam 
blocker). Email spam filtering can be provided by either the email 
server (e.g., gmail) or by an Android client side email application. 
Research studies also attempt to mitigate the spam problem on 
mobile devices. An example is the SMSAssassin [74] that applies 
Bayesian Network and SVM algorithms for detecting spam SMS, 
while keeping the model updated using crowd sourcing. 
3.6 Automated Application Analysis 
Since Android (and Google) does not provide a certification 
process for applications (similar to the Apple application store), 
many attempts have been made to apply automated application 
analysis (both static and dynamic). Android .apk files encapsulate 
valuable information that can help understand an application’s 
behavior. This information includes requested permissions, 
framework methods called by the application, framework classes 
used by the application, user interface widgets, and more. Schmidt 
et al. [75] evaluated a framework for static function call analysis 
and performed a statistical analysis on function calls used by 
native applications. In [75], Schmidt et al. (2009) proposed a 
collaborative approach for analyzing applications and the 
detection of Android malware. In [76], machine learning 
classifiers were applied on static features extracted from 
Android’s application files. In this approach, the application file is 
represented by a vector of static features extracted from the file, 
and the classifiers are then applied to learn patterns in the code in 
order to classify new files. Chaudhuri [77] presented a formal 
language for describing Android applications and data flow 
among an application’s components. This formal language can be 
used for statically analyzing Android applications and data flow 
between applications and comparing those with security 
specifications defined in the application’s manifest. This lays the 
groundwork for security decisions such as: is the application safe 
and does it do what it claimed to do. Therefore, it can provide the 
means for a developer to certify its application and for the user to 
verify the proof of the certification before installation. The 
Crowdroid framework [78] performs dynamic analysis of Android 
applications. It analyzes traces collected from many devices in an 
attempt to detect malicious behavior. The DroidRanger [79] uses 
permission-based filtering and heuristic-based behavioral 
footprint matching for the detection of malware in different 
application stores. In [80], a thorough analysis of permissions that 
are requested by applications is performed in order to detect 
potentially malicious applications. Automated application analysis 
is closely coupled with malware detection mechanisms and 
certification and can provide an automated alternative as a part of 
the certification process. In this way developers can certify their 
applications, and users can verify the validity of the certification 
before installation. In an attempt to reduce malware getting on the 
play store, Google introduce on 2012 the Bouncer service, which 
was shown to be easily bypassed by Oberheide and Miller [81]. 
3.7 Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) 
Data leakage prevention mechanisms prevent sensitive/private 
content from leaking out. Identification of such content is carried 
out by various content and context inspection mechanisms (e.g., 
predefined keywords and patterns/regular expressions, 
fingerprinting of sensitive content and statistical algorithms). 
These mechanisms haven't yet been fully integrated into smart 
mobile platforms despite the fact that these devices can store 
content that should be protected (e.g., location, documents, 
contacts, calendar, etc.) Various research papers analyze the 
behavior of applications and granted permissions on mobile 
devices through network features and their access to sensitive data 
in order to detect potential leakage incidents [72]. An additional 
DLP feature, anti-theft, is provided for smartphones by several 
security vendors. This feature provides remote control capability 
over the device in case it gets lost or stolen. This module enables 
users to locate the device, block it, and wipe its data remotely. 
3.8 Address Space Layout Randomization 
and Data Execution Prevention 
Since the release of Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich) and 
Android 4.1 (Jelly Bean), Google added full implementation of 
two new mechanisms to enhance the system security. Address 
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a technology used to 
prevent shell code from being run successfully. It does so by 
randomizing the base points of various areas of memory (e.g., 
stack, heap, libs, etc.) The goal of ASLR is to make certain classes 
of control-hijacking attacks more difficult. Attacks are 
significantly harder to develop and execute because of the 
following: executable code residing in unknown locations, variety 
buffer, or stack overflow. Data Execution Prevention (DEP) is a 
mechanism that prevents certain memory sectors, e.g., the stack, 
from being executed (also known as Nx bit). When combined, the 
exploitation of vulnerabilities in applications using shell code or 
return-oriented programming (ROP) techniques are becoming 
difficult in a mobile platform [46]. 
3.9 Virtualizations, Security Extensions 
Virtualization is an emerging trend that is slowly becoming 
supported by different Android implementations, third party 
software stacks, and hardware implementations in order to enable 
multiple isolated phones (environments) to run on the same 
device. We distinguish between five types of virtualization: Linux 
virtualization (Domains), micro kernel virtualization, full 
virtualization with binary translation, para virtualization, and 
hardware-assisted (faithful) virtualization. These approaches 
differ primarily regarding the layers of the operating system (OS) 
and HW in which virtualization functionality is implemented. Full 
virtualization with binary translation, para virtualization and 
hardware-assisted (faithful) virtualization represent a historical 
evolution of virtualization within the server world which was not 
adopted by the mobile world. In this chapter we also address other 
topics which are not directly related to virtualization but are 
important components of mobile security solutions which are used 
in combination with virtualization solutions. 
Linux Based Virtualization 
The Linux based virtualization is pseudo-virtualization that uses 
the capability of Linux Containers (LXC) which relies on the 
features of Kernel namespaces isolation and control groups 
(cgroups) in order to create different isolated execution spaces 
which serve as a basis for different virtual phones. Each container 
can be configured to gain access to its own isolated resources such 
network interface (and IP address), file system and process in 
terms of security and resource usage [82], [83]. Solutions that fall 
under this category utilize a single OS kernel across all virtual 
phones (as opposed to running multiple OS instances) where each 
virtualized phone operates in its own isolated system-level 
container. These solutions usually implement a thin intermediate 
layer that manages administration of the containers, 
communication between containers such as notifications (an 
example of the architecture is shown in Fig. 1). 
Practically speaking, each virtual phone runs its own Zygote 
process (the initial Android Dalvik process), and each application 
within a virtual phone is forked from the Zygote process running 
on the same virtual phone. The main advantage of such an 
approach is the ease of deployment on devices, minimal reliance 
on hardware capabilities, and better multi-virtual phone usability 
thanks to the single OS context. The disadvantage lies in the fact 
that the kernel which serves all virtual phones is a TCB (the whole 
kernel). This is similar in size to the regular kernel so if someone 
hacks into the kernel, all the instances are compromised at some 
level. Examples of vendors providing Linux virtualization include 
Cellrox [84] and Divide [85]. 
 
Fig. 1. An example of Linux virtualization implementation. 
Micro Kernel Virtualization 
In micro kernel virtualization the kernel is divided into two parts, 
the micro kernel and the kernel itself [86]. The micro kernel runs 
in privileged mode and the kernel runs in user mode. Micro 
kernels follow the minimal TCB principle and therefore, radically 
reduce the amount of code running in privileged mode by only 
providing the basis needed to implement functionality in user 
space. Critical modules that control primary resources (memory 
and process management and scheduling) are included in the 
micro kernel and are modified for virtualization. The kernel on 
top of the micro kernel is adapted to work with the micro kernel in 
order to support this separation and provides support to virtualized 
resources with a special driver. On top of the kernel is a 
specialized Android system which is adapted to the kernel runs on 
it. The Android is not aware of the fact that multiple stacks of 
kernels and Android frameworks are running simultaneously 
above it (see Fig. 2). Examples of vendors providing micro kernel 
solutions are: Trust2Core which is based on the L4 micro kernel 
[87] and OK Android [88]. 
Hardware-Assisted Virtualization 
Hardware assisted virtualization, in which the hardware plays an 
important role in the virtualization tasks, is considered the most 
advanced form of virtualization. The hardware’s roles depend on 
the vendor and its existing virtualization extensions where the 
trend includes forward improvement and enhancement of such 
extensions (see Fig. 3). 
The hardware virtualization concept actually replaces the 
components implemented by para virtualization and full 
virtualization and thus, reduces the overhead on the software stack 
as well as possible vulnerabilities. Hardware virtualization has 
flourished in the server world and is slowly entering the 
smartphone world where the vendors are developing new 
opportunities. One example of advanced hardware based 
virtualization capabilities exists in the new ARM processors 
where you can find: 
 The introduction of a new hypervisor execution mode of 
higher priority than supervisor mode. This will enable the 
VMM to execute at a higher privilege than the Guest OSs and 
the Guest OSs to execute with traditional OS privileges, 
removing the need to employ para virtualization techniques. 
 The provision of mechanisms to aid interrupt handling, with 
native distinction of interrupt destined to secure monitor, 
hypervisors, currently active Guest OSs, or non-currently-
active Guest OSs. This will dramatically reduce the 
complexity of handling interrupts using software emulation 
techniques and shadow structures inside the VMM. 
 The provision of a System MMU to aid memory management. 
This will support multiple translation contexts for multiple 
DMA capable masters, two levels of address translation and 
hardware acceleration, and abstraction. 
 The support in debug functionality. This is aimed at enabling 
debugger access to individual Guest OSs  
To the best of our knowledge, as of today there is no vendor 
which utilizes complete hardware based virtualization capabilities 
in order to deliver complete hardware based virtualization for 
Android. This situation will probably change in the near future. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Micro kernel 
virtualization. 
Fig. 3. Hardware-Assisted 
Virtualization. 
Secure Boot 
The secure boot is a mechanism enabled by hardware capabilities 
such as the ones that exist on ARM where it verifies the integrity 
of boot images prior to loading them. The secure boot ensures all 
system software components are in a known and "trusted" state 
prior to running them. The secure boot process implements a 
chain of trust. Starting with an implicitly trusted component, 
every other component can be authenticated before being 
executed. The ownership of the chain can change at each stage - a 
public key belonging to the device OEM might be used to 
authenticate the first boot loader, but the secure world OS binary 
might include a secondary public key that is used to authenticate 
the applications that it loads. 
Containers 
A new breed of security solutions involves security containers that 
do not reflect a specific technique or technology, but instead are 
based on a similar product definition. Containers are most often 
regular applications (APK) that run on a device. Some containers 
come preloaded on the device such as in the case of Samsung 
KNOX [89] which only requires enabling, and some containers 
are fully downloadable .apks which enable the container. The 
functionality of containers includes (usually but not necessarily): 
 Integration with a remote MDM for policy enforcement and 
retrieval. The container is the MDM agent on the device 
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which is responsible for communicating with the MDM server 
and verifying integrity. 
 Secure filesystem in which the container replaces the file 
operations on the Android level (or lower level in case of 
hardware integrated containers) with operations that are 
secure. 
 Possible integration with SELinux as an enforcement 
mechanism to prevent cross access to data and functionality 
which resides within the container versus outside of the 
container. 
 Authentication and authorization of users prior to using the 
sensitive applications and data inside the container. 
 Integration of device configuration in order to transfer MDM 
policy commands. 
The way to implement the isolation of applications and data 
related to the container is container specific. Some containers 
have access to the ROM flashed on the device which can provide 
deeper integration into the OS, and other downloadable containers 
use available Android services or hidden ones in order to provide 
the suggested functionality. Two additional examples for 
container-based products are Mobile Spaces [90] and VMWare 
Mobile [91]. 
Trusted Execution Environment 
A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a secure area that 
resides in the application processor of an electronic device. The 
TEE ensures the secure storage and processing of sensitive data 
and trusted applications. 
TIMA 
TIMA is Samsung proprietary solution which is based on 
TrustZone and is responsible on continuous verification of the 
integrity of the kernel. The verification process runs inside the 
TEE, together with the secure boot, and ensures a strong form of 
protection from software based vulnerabilities which result in 
modifications to the kernel’s storage or memory. 
Solutions that fall under the trusted computing environment are 
the ARM Cotex-A9 [92], Quallcom Snapdragon [93], 
TRUSTONIC [94], and Cryptocell [95]. 
3.10 Mobile Device Management (MDM) 
Mobile devices management is not a specific security technology 
but rather a category of products that provide tools to 
organizations which assist them in deploying configuration 
policies and monitoring these policies, and provide other 
centralized tasks. 
4. EVALUATION CRITERIA 
In this section we describe a set of criteria for evaluating security 
solutions and components for Android-based mobile devices. This 
set of criteria is used later on for evaluating several security 
components. Creating the criteria list is based, first and foremost, 
on the initial perception of the evaluator; in our analysis we have 
taken the role of a company/organization interested in building a 
secure mobile solution as well as using it. 
Visibility 
The visibility criterion indicates the amount of effort that should 
be invested by the attacker in order to identify the existence of the 
solution on the device and further extract information about it. 
Identification can be achieved by all means starting from running 
specific software on the device, inspecting the device physically, 
monitoring network traffic, etc. The visibility criterion can be 
divided into the following aspects: 
 Physical Visibility – Indicates whether the security solution 
can be observed by an attacker holding the secured device, 
either by looking at the device or by physical (visual) 
inspection of the device; for example, the solution may use 
specific additional hardware (e.g., special micro SD card, or 
battery) that is noticeable physically. 
 Runtime Visibility – Indicates what level of knowledge and 
inspection is required in order to notice and learn about the 
security solution via a piece of code running on the same 
device. Here we have a split analysis in which we evaluate the 
visibility from an application which owns root privileges or 
does not. For example, is viewing the task manager sufficient 
enough to detect the security solution? This criterion includes 
also the ability to detect the security solution via the available 
device features (e.g., camera, Wi-Fi modem) or unique setting 
to device peripherals, as well as deviation from normal 
behavior such as fast battery drain or high CPU usage at idle 
time. 
 Network-based Visibility– Whether the security solution can 
be detected through analysis of the network traffic by finding 
unique patterns of the solution, such as extensive network 
activity with regard to the application running at the moment 
or unusual network settings in the device (e.g., open ports). 
This criterion is also divided into visibility from within the 
device and visibility on network elements where traffic 
originating to and from the device passes through. 
 Replicating Detection – The detection effort of a previously 
detected solution criterion represents the effort needed for 
identifying another device installed with the same security 
solution after a single device has been compromised. 
Security Solution Administration – Reflects various aspects of 
provisioning, removing, managing and controlling the security 
solution and/or the device. 
 Remote Control – Is this possible and how to manage and 
control the security solution remotely through a network 
connection. 
 Switching Time – The time it takes to move from the non-
secure area to the secure area assuming the security solution 
provides such areas. For example, can it be done with a simple 
click or, does it require a restart of the device, and how long 
the switch takes. 
 Installation and Updates – What is the method of 
installation, how long it takes to install, can it be installed 
from a remote location, how does the security solution receive 
updates. 
Inherent Cost 
The cost criterion evaluates the level and type of resources that 
are required for implementing the solution where the main driver 
for cost is what kind of code modifications are required (kernel, 
Android framework, device drivers) in order to implement the 
solution and which third party components are available for reuse. 
The second aspect of the cost criterion is migration cost where we 
will evaluate the cost to migrate the solution to devices from other 
vendors as well as new devices from the same vendor. 
Security Level 
The last and probably most important criterion is the security 
criterion. It reflects the level of security the solution provides, 
what types of threats are mitigated, how easy it is to bypass/attack 
the solution; what is exposed if such a device is captured (only the 
solution or also the data on it). Analyzing the security level per 
solution is no single dimensional since it depends significantly on 
the attack target and vector. We will present examples of attack 
targets and vectors and inspect them in light of a specific solution.  
This can serve as a template for anyone interested in evaluating a 
specific solution for its own needs. 
Miscellaneous 
The data flow criterion refers to any supported functionalities for 
handling data stored on the device and how data can be 
transferred from one environment to the other. 
5. SOLUTION EVALUATION 
In this section we demonstrate the application of the proposed 
evaluation framework (i.e., criteria). We chose Linux based 
virtualization and micro kernel based virtualization technologies 
as evaluation candidates. 
5.1 Evaluating Linux-based Virtualization 
 
Visibility 
Physical Visibility 
As a software-only implementation there is no visual/physical 
indication which can be observed on the device. Some 
commercial products which rely on this type of virtualization and 
are targeted at work/life use do provide on-screen visual 
indicators. There is also the risk in specific Linux containers a 
specific set of hardware resources will not be configured as 
accessible, and as such, Android itself will present specific 
indications (i.e., no network) which can raise suspicions; however, 
but such indications do not imply in 100% the existence of the 
solution which can be caused by other technical reasons. 
Runtime Visibility  
Rooted phone: In a rooted phone these mechanisms are visible 
based on changed device drivers, enablement of the capabilities 
required for Linux Containers on the kernel. The root enables 
immediate access to the environment of a specific container 
though there are attacks which enable identification of the 
containerization itself. SELinux enabled on a Linux based 
Virtualization can remove the risk of visibility in rooted mode. 
Non rooted phone: Each virtual phone can be configured with 
different access to device features (GPS, Camera, network, etc.) 
and special configurations which are not customary on specific 
phone models and OS versions and this discrepancy from a 
standard model configuration can raise alertness as for to the 
existence of such solution – i.e., hiding the GPS hardware can 
lead to a “strange” configuration from a running software point of 
view. Rooted and non-rooted phones can raise this suspicion 
level. 
Rooted and non-rooted phones: The CPU and battery overhead of 
such a solution is low and barely noticeable from a UX 
performance point of view. The battery consumption is mildly 
affected by the Linux virtualization solution since unlike other 
solutions (which have more complex virtualization tasks) here we 
have a single kernel running with optimized scheduling of 
resources among processes. The CPU overhead is also minimal 
thanks to the simplicity of multiplexing and today’s common 
multi core architectures. 
Linux containers also provide the option to “freeze” specific 
containers, so in a specific virtual phone setup where the 
foreground container is the only one that is active, the impact on 
the user will be almost negligible. When the background 
containers are active, running tasks which consume a high number 
of CPU cycles, it may raise the suspicion level. 
Network-based Visibility  
Each virtual phone has its own MAC address, based on the 
network namespace. The virtual phone does not force any special 
networking behavior, and as such, it can't be detected by unaware 
network analysis. A risk point exists if someone is able to observe 
the data stream of the two different virtual phones while being 
able to verify that both streams arrive from the same physical 
device (a single device in the network). For example, if the user 
identifies concurrent push connections to Google servers where 
there is supposed to be only one (one per Android instance) then 
this can be a suspicious indication of virtualization. In general, 
from its own perspective, a device with a VP solution behaves 
normally, meaning the network behavior is exactly the same as in 
a regular ROM with multiple processes using the network.  
From the inner perspective of a software (non-root) monitoring 
the network inside a specific container the existence of 
virtualization cannot be deduced. A piece of software which has 
root privileges can monitor networking at a lower level of the 
networking stack where the mere existence of the network 
multiplexing on a single hardware device can be identified. 
Security Solution Administration 
Remote Control 
Existing Linux virtualization implementations do not support 
remote management. Commercial products have implemented the 
capability to manage containers and created integration into MDM 
solutions in order to manage groups of devices. From a technical 
perspective, controlling other containers is possible either via a 
container with high privileges or via the root container which 
controls all other containers. 
Switching Time 
Switching between containers can be accomplished in many ways 
(through an application, Android trigger, etc.) This is very fast 
and primarily depends on additional administrative processes built 
into the process of switching instances. The switching time is very 
close to the time it takes to achieve a process switch on the 
processor and as such, it is almost imperceptible. This estimation 
is based on the assumption that the containers are active and not 
frozen in the background and that there are no special actions 
triggered by the switch, such as encryption and decryption of 
memory/storage. 
Installation and Updates 
A basic implementation of Linux based virtualization requires 
building the Linux kernel after setting it in a special kernel 
configuration. It also requires modifications to the Android 
framework and modifications to some device drivers which need 
to be aware of such virtualization. This set of changes requires a 
custom ROM type of deployment scheme where installation is 
done via physical access. Over the air (OTA) updates are possible 
for such solutions although they may open a new attack vector 
due to the fact they enable OTA to critical parts of the operating 
system which can be abused by an attacker for malicious 
purposes. The alternative to OTA updates is, of course, secondary 
custom ROM upgrades on the device. 
Inherent Implementation Cost 
Creating a basic Android virtualization based on Linux Containers 
requires a vast amount of resources. The implementation requires 
modifications at all levels of the stack and only within the kernel 
is a reuse of the virtualization capability possible. Any advanced 
implementation of Android virtualization will also require 
modifications to the kernel base capability. 
The migration effort to adapt the solution to new devices within 
the same product family or to support a whole new device 
category depends on the changes between the different platforms 
in these areas: the kernel, device drivers, and Android framework. 
These changes along with new versions or new devices dictate the 
level of changes required in the solution. Usually, within the same 
product the changes are minimal except for regular Android 
versioning and changes in device drivers due to incremental 
changes in the hardware specifications. Still, the leap between 
product generations can be so large that it will reflect an effort 
similar to new implementation of a new device family. 
Security 
Top-down Analysis 
Analysis of the security level of such a solution is a complicated 
process and depends significantly on specific implementation. 
Commercial vendors using such technology usually fortify it with 
additional security extensions which dramatically change the 
picture in terms of vulnerabilities. We will assume for this 
analysis a plain vanilla implementation, which takes out-of-the-
box Linux based virtualization and implements only the needed 
modifications on the Android level and device drivers to maintain 
basic operation.  
We will take a top down approach in which we will first examine 
the attack from a non-rooted application running on an Android 
container. 
Android no-root: The challenges for an attacker on this level are 
the same as the challenges of an attacker running on any Android. 
The vulnerabilities that exist on the same version and/or in 
combination with the specific hardware will also be available 
here. Additional risk is created based on the unique changes 
implemented at the Android level and device drivers in order to 
enable the virtualization. Such changes can expose new 
vulnerabilities, as well as disclose existing vulnerabilities by 
mistake or on purpose. Once a vulnerability is found and is being 
exploited, the impact depends on the exploit target. Here we 
assume that the exploit target was privilege escalation, and the 
running process/code received root permissions. 
Process with root: Up until version 1.0, a process running in a 
Container whether secure or not can gain root privileges using 
common Linux vulnerabilities.. If the attacker is running in the 
secure area then the root privileges are sufficient to access all the 
sensitive material so no further attacks are needed depend on the 
setup and configuration of the container. In cases in which there is 
true isolation between the resources allocated to the secure and 
non-secure containers, an exploit towards the area of container 
administration will be required as it is the only way to access 
control of the secure container. Of course, the root enables other 
attacks which can trace networking, for example, or activating 
side channel attacks to deduce related information or information 
that belongs to the secure area. Still, such attacks will have lower 
impact than an attack which eventually gains control of the secure 
container and its assets. In general, since the Linux Containers 
technology is based on a shared kernel, the options for exploiting 
the system are wide. Following the 1.0 release on Feb 2014 the 
LXC concept has gained an important improvement - the user 
level Containers. By implementing this concept, gaining root 
privileges inside a container is impossible and even escaping the 
container does not allow immediately root privileges. 
Data Flow  
Secured data flow can be provided from one container to the 
other. This can be implemented in various ways including a 
dedicated secured inter-process communication channel. 
Communication between different containers via shared storage 
resources is, of course, possible, as well as via regular 
connectivity facilities of a specific container with a host computer 
(sync etc.). Any communication or sharing capability between 
containers increases the risk of finding vulnerabilities in such 
mechanisms and poses a higher risk on the overall mechanism 
where such vulnerabilities can be comparable to receiving control 
of the containers due to code injection techniques. An attack can 
abuse the sharing/communication mechanism to inject code to the 
secure area and gain control. 
5.2 Micro Kernel Virtualization 
Visibility 
Physical Visibility 
As a software-based solution the micro kernel does not have 
physical identifiers and cannot be detected by visual methods 
alone. This excludes any UI changes in the boot process as well as 
in the Android stack, which can be implemented as part of such a 
solution. In the case of the UX which provides a visual means of 
switching among the instances, such details can point to a specific 
solution. In specific implementations the recovery mode and 
behavior can be modified to eliminate options for overriding the 
implementation, and as such, it can be a visual signal of the 
existence of the solution. Also, special hardware configuration 
within specific instances can cause Android itself to either behave 
differently or provide different visual indications although such 
changes do not imply directly to a specific solution, and they can 
be derived from other circumstances. 
Runtime Visibility  
Special hardware configuration that is not customary to the 
specific hardware mode can be a suspicious sign of virtualization 
on rooted and non-rooted devices. The virtualization overhead in 
this case can be detected (with false alarms) using timing attacks 
at runtime in a non-rooted mode; while in rooted mode, several 
virtualization artifacts can be used for detecting the virtualization, 
such as special configuration keys, storage names, network card 
addresses, etc.  
The battery consumption is affected by micro kernel solutions and 
the waste can go from 30% to 60% depending on the 
implementation. The impact can be attributed due to the fact that 
the software manages the virtualization by itself, as well as the 
management of IO switching between instances. Complexity in 
the implementation of power management for a virtualized 
environment can be the reason for such overhead. The CPU usage 
should not be dramatically high except in situations in which 
many context switches occur, for example, in IO intensive 
activities which span multiple instances. Today, with multi core 
CPUs the overhead of context switching of micro kernels is 
minimal. 
The micro kernel architecture does not have an impact on 
networking in terms of traffic overhead. These assumptions can 
impact the suspicion level which can be raised by a code running 
and monitoring these parameters. Still, it will always raise 
suspicions but never directly imply the existence of the underlying 
mechanisms. 
Network-based Visibility 
The micro kernel does not force any special networking behavior 
and as such it cannot be detected upon network analysis. The 
micro kernel does enable, in theory, the behavior of multiple 
instances using the networking resource at the same time. 
However, in practice, the network has to be locked before each 
instance uses it, so eventually it behaves like two applications that 
are using the network at the same time. It might be the case that 
each virtual phone implemented over the micro kernel exposes its 
own unique information (such as phone numbers on one phone 
that are not used on the other). Still, identifying such 
discrepancies requires that monitoring software be installed on 
multiple instances in order to conduct such a comparison. An 
application which has root privileges cannot intercept 
communication arriving from different instances due to the fact 
the networking stack is not shared. Unless a vulnerability is found 
at the hardware level or device drivers which can serve as a 
breach to the infrastructure of the micro kernel and if such 
vulnerability is found then a multiplexing behavior can be 
identified on such level. 
Security Solution Administration 
Remote Control 
In a micro kernel setup a specific OS instance can be set with 
privileges high enough to control resources available to other 
instances, and this, combined with a proprietary control 
mechanism implemented in all instances (remote control agent), 
can be the basis from which a solution of remote control can be 
devised. Unlike the Linux Containers solution there is no base 
capability to start and stop containers or to administrate them; the 
setup of the instances is wired into the custom ROM containing 
the device image. Building a remote control mechanism which 
will control the instances on a micro kernel based phone defeats 
the isolation achieved by the mechanism and places all defenses at 
high risk. This is due to the fact that an attacker can exploit such 
mechanisms from the outside or the inside and gain control of 
important assets. 
Switching Time 
The switching time between instances is unnoticeable, because all 
of the instances are active and available for scheduling via the 
micro kernel. In the transition between instances there isn’t a 
process of snapshotting and restoring the instance state. This is 
because each instance is in a state of activity in which its 
resources are being mapped differently, and each instance is 
associated with different permissions. The switch operation does 
only remapping of the resources into the new instance and as such 
do not take long time. 
Installation and Updates 
Since a micro kernel based environment involves changes on the 
kernel, the level of the drivers, and the Android framework, a 
custom ROM is required, and its deployment and update process 
is similar to any ROM update and installation procedure. An OTA 
mechanism for the software which resides within a specific 
instance is possible for implementation although its capabilities 
will be only replacement of applications and services and not 
changes in the OS stack. Core functionality, such as the kernel, 
device drivers, or the Android stack would not be included within 
these boundaries. From a software composition perspective each 
instance can have its own unique software stack within each OS 
instance in which, for example, one instance can run Linux alone, 
another instance can run Android 4.3, and a third can run Android 
KitKat (4.4), as long as all of the software stacks are adapted to 
run within the micro kernel framework. 
Inherent Implementation Cost 
Implementation of a micro kernel based solution renders a high 
cost since it requires implementation of a micro kernel stack 
(reuse from an open source micro kernel is possible although 
many additions are required to reach an operational code base), 
implementation of device drivers and device driver wrappers, and 
modifications to Android itself. Deep involvement into the device 
drivers makes the solution highly dependent on specific chipsets, 
and hardware vendors in general, which makes migration to other 
vendors of high cost as well. Each manufacturer can use different 
chipsets and/or specialized hardware, which require different 
drivers. Another parameter which impacts the complexity of 
device driver adaptation is the market position of the micro kernel 
vendor in which access to proprietary information related to the 
drivers can have dramatic impact on implementation and product 
testing costs. There is a big difference between adapting the micro 
kernel behavior towards a known device driver with a good 
understanding of its underlying function versus a device in which 
the code is unknown and the virtualization is required to 
generalize itself in order to adapt to the general behavior of the 
device. 
With regard to other Android versions, the changes required for 
implementation depend primarily on the changes to the kernel and 
changes in the functionality of Android itself.  
A high cost entailed in the process of building such a product is 
product testing which eventually includes a drastic modification to 
the basic operation of the device, and given this, it has to be tested 
as if it is a new OS release. Of course, the scope of testing 
depends on the target usage patterns and the size of the target 
audience. 
Security 
Top-Down Analysis 
As in the Linux virtualization analysis we will assume a plain 
vanilla implementation, which assumes an out-of-the-box micro-
kernel based solution (there is no such thing as an out-of-the-box 
micro kernel, since all implementations are specific, but we will 
imagine an implementation which is based only on the capabilities 
provided by the micro kernel concept itself).  
We will take a top down approach in which we will first examine 
the attack from a non-rooted application running on an Android 
instance with a basic setup of a secure OS instance which runs in 
parallel to a non-secure OS instance. Our application runs in the 
non-secure instance. 
Android no-root: 
In the scenario of an Android running within a micro kernel OS 
instance the vulnerabilities possible are the same as in any other 
Android, except for two special cases: new vulnerabilities inside 
the changed device drivers/kernel as a result of the micro kernel 
implementation and new vulnerabilities which can exist due to the 
special hardware setup assigned to this specific OS. For example, 
in the latter case, if the OS instance does not receive access to the 
network driver and network activities, this special configuration 
can lead to consequences and suspicious behavior in the kernel 
(special crashes) which can open up a new set of vulnerabilities. 
Once a vulnerability is exploited, the range of actions which can 
be taken by the exploit is dramatically smaller and confined to the 
assets and resources associated with the current OS instance. Even 
if there is an exploit which provides escalation of privileges and 
access to the kernel, the micro kernel lower layer protects the 
resources. Unless it is hacked, other OS instances and their 
respective resources stay untouched. Having said that, specific 
commercial solutions may implement different mechanisms which 
can create other access points to the secure OS instance.  These 
can become weak links in the chain which can make the life of an 
attacker easier in that the attacker can make use of these access 
points instead of trying to hack and attack the micro kernel itself. 
Reaching a root inside the non-secure instance does not present an 
immediate risk to the secure instance, and one needs to attack the 
micro kernel itself in order to reach other OS instances. Micro 
kernel related attacks are not available publicly yet, and currently, 
the primary preference is for denial of service attacks on the micro 
kernel [96]. 
Data Flow  
Different instances running on a micro kernel can communicate 
with each other as if they are two different operating systems 
running on different devices. The micro kernel itself does not 
provide a special means of communicating among instances, 
although commercial products include such an option to enable 
different applications. This type of a channel, as well as any other 
option to communicate among instances, creates a risk of 
penetrating the secure area using protocol vulnerabilities and 
option code injection.  
Table. 2. Comparing Linux virtualization vs. microkernel virtualization. 
Criterion Linux Virtualization 
Micro-kernel 
Virtualization 
Physical Visibility None None 
Runtime Visibility 
Without root 
Highly Limited Highly Limited 
Runtime Visibility 
With root 
Easy Difficult 
Network based 
Visibility 
Highly Limited Highly Limited 
Remote control Possible Possible 
Switching time Unnoticeable Unnoticeable 
Installation and 
updates 
Custom ROM + Partial 
OTA Possible 
Custom ROM + Partial 
OTA Possible 
Inherent 
Implementation 
Cost 
High Cost High Cost 
Security level  Medium High 
Data Flow Custom Mechanisms Custom Mechanisms 
6. DISCUSSION 
In this study we propose a set of criteria for evaluating security 
solutions for Android-based mobile devices. Evaluating a security 
solution depends significantly on the needs of the evaluator and 
the role the security solution will play. In this document we take 
the role of a company which wants to build/own a secure Android 
solution and wants to understand the impact of the decision to buy 
versus build based on criterions such as cost versus control on 
security. We demonstrate the evaluation framework on two new 
types of phone virtualization that represent different directions for 
virtualization that exist in commercial products today and serve as 
the basis for groups of products: Linux based virtualization and 
micro kernel based virtualization. Table 2 presents a summary of 
the comparison between the two virtualization methods. Another 
product group which provides virtualization like experiences 
include products which are categorized as general containers but 
because they don’t share a similar design principle or 
implementation direction, evaluating them as one coherent group 
will not reflect all of the products’ specific details. This evaluation 
framework can be extended and parts of its criteria substituted 
with alternative criteria in order to be adapted to different 
evaluation targets. For example, the Inherent Implementation Cost 
criterion is not relevant when an enterprise is looking to adopt a 
mobile security solution since the enterprise just adopts a security 
solution and does not implement one. For an enterprise the aspect 
of group based policy enforcement is of higher interest in order to 
streamline security processes. 
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